ABSTRACT: We study the competitive prices of duopoly two-sided platforms with differentiation of crossgroup network externality strengths under two different levels of agents' information which are informed and uninformed through the Stackelberg pricing games model based on standard Hotelling model and the assumptions that the agents of platform form responsive expectations if they are informed and form passive expectations if they are uninformed. The results include the structures of equilibrium prices, the comparison of equilibrium prices between two platforms and the responses of equilibrium prices to the strengths of crossgroup network externality and horizontal differentiation. We also find that there are significant differences in pricing strategies between not only the two sequential pricing platforms but also the one platform under two different levels of agents' information through the comparisons among the results.
GENERAL INSTRUCTION
In markets with two-sided network effects, the value that an agent derives from joining a platform is determined by the number of agents on the other side. Examples include B2C e-commercial platforms like Taobao or Jingdong, payment systems like Visa or AliPay, Web search platforms like Baidu or Google and operation systems like Windows, etc. Because of this cross-group network externality, the number of agents that join each side ultimately depends on the prices charged to both sides. (Rochet & Tirole 2003 , 2006 . Therefore, the agents' information about the prices or demand of the other side will influence their decisions. Agents can take all prices into account when forming expectations, namely keep the expectations consistent with the real demand if the agents are informed for the prices or demand of the other side. However, some agents may not take all prices into account when forming expectations if they are uninformed. For instance, they may not investigate the prices of the other side or have sufficient information about aggregate demand on each side to compute each demand's responsiveness to price changes. Instead, agents typically rely on external information to form expectations about the total number of developers that join a given platform. Expectations formed in this way usually do not respond to changes in platform prices. (Gabszewicz & Wauthy 2013 , Hagiu & Hałaburda 2014 In conclusion, agents' responses to the price changes and the equilibrium prices of platforms will be different rely on different levels of agents' information.
Meanwhile, differentiated competitions are very common in real two-sided market. The differentiations between competitive platforms will be in respect of location, preference, scale or quality, etc, and usually include more than one of them. For example, China Mobile and China Unicom are differentiate not only in the standard of 4G technology but also in user scale, Taobao and Jingdong are differentiate not only in the types but also in the qualities of commodity.
Then, we study the price strategies of two-sided platforms with horizontal differentiation and differentiation of cross-group network externality strengths under different levels of agent' information, when they take Stackelberg pricing competition (also be called Bertrand-Stackelberg competition). We investigate the structures of equilibrium prices, the comparisons of equilibrium prices between two sequentially pricing platforms and the responses of equilibrium prices to the strengths of cross-group network externality and horizontal differentiation through the Stackelberg pricing games model based on standard Hotelling model and the assumptions that the agents of platform form responsive expectations if they are informed and form responsive expectations if they are uninformed.
The related literature can divide into two parts, one part is about the information or expectations of twosided market. The other one is about the differentiated competitions of two-sided platforms, as following:
(1) Information or expectations of two-sided market. The majority of the existing literature on two-sided platform pricing typically assumes that agents on all sides have full information about all prices and are able to perfectly compute their impact on platform adoption. In other words, expectations adjust perfectly in response to changes in platform prices (e.g. Only two papers, which are Gabszewicz & Wauthy (2012) and Hagiu & Hałaburda (2014) , incorporated passive expectations to two-sided model under uninformed condition. They assumed that the agents of platform would keep their expectations fixed regardless the variation of the prices, but the responsive and passive were all rational and fulfilled in equilibrium. Passive expectations were first introduced in the economic literature on one-sided network effects by Katz & Shapiro (1985) . This was also the first paper to explicitly distinguish passive expectations from responsive expectations. In particular, Katz & Shapiro (1985) study Cournot competition between n firms (technologies) with direct network effects. Gabszewicz & Wauthy (2013) firstly introduce the passive expectations into the researches about twosided market and studied the output of monopoly and duopoly market with differentiation of expectations between two platforms. Hagiu & Hałaburda (2014) have improved the above research, they systematically study the effects of agents' information levels to equilibrium prices and profits in monopoly and duopoly market with Hotelling competition. Besides the comparisons of pure responsive expectations and passive expectations scenarios, they have considered the hybrid scenario of above two expectations and introduced the wary expectations under which agents may adjust expectations based on changes in their prices. Second, hybrid of horizontal differentiation and sequential differentiation. Diao et al. (2008) have introduced the Stackelberg pricing game model to standard Hotelling model to study the duopoly onesided platforms with asymmetric direct network externalities. They found that the firms obtain more product differentiation in Stackelberg equilibrium comparing traditional Nash equilibrium and price leader enjoying higher price, share, profits in the market than the subsequent entrant. Xie & Li (2014) also use Hotelling model to study the duopoly with sequential entry. They investigate the optimal IT investment, namely optimal direct network externalities, and compare the optimal investment strategies of early entrant with that of the later entrant.
Third, vertical differentiation. Cao et al. (2008) have studied the duopoly one-sided platforms with differentiation of direct network externalities, they found that the network externality is not necessary to bring more profit for platforms in selecting the optimal pricing strategy, this depends on the strength of the network externality and the service quality/price ratio provided by platform. Diao et al. (2009) have study the optimal qualities of duopoly one-sided platforms with differentiation of direct network externalities through a three-stages game model.
Fourth, hybrid differentiation including all above. Ji & Wang (2014) have taken all three types of differentiation into consideration. They have studied the duopoly two-sided platforms with Stackelberg pricing game, horizontal differentiation and differentiation of cross-group network externalities network externalities. They found that the platform with higher cross-group network externality and later pricing would take more advantages than the other one.
In conclusion, the main contribution of this paper is to study the prices of asymmetric competition under uniformed agents and compare the prices with that of the informed agents. Though Hagiu & Hałaburda (2014) have studied both situations which were informed and uninformed agents, they only have considered the symmetric competition, so can't reflect the differences of competitive strategies between asymmetric platforms. Some paper (Cao et Specifically, assume that a fraction λ of users are informed, while the remaining fraction 1 λ − of users are uninformed and hold passive expectations. Throughout the paper we assume that all developers are informed, because the developers (or buyers) are usually proficient to collect and analyse information.
Specifically, assume that a fraction λ of users are informed, while the remaining fraction 1 λ − of users are uninformed and hold passive expectations. Throughout the paper we assume that all developers are informed, because the developers (or buyers) are usually proficient to collect and analyse information.
From the perspective of developers who are profit-oriented, the two platforms are identical, but developers are allowed to multi-home, i.e., join both platforms. Contrary, from the perspective of users with diversity of preference, the two platforms are horizontal differentiation, and the users are interested in joining at most one platform, i.e., they single-home (such market structure is called "competitive bottleneck").
The sequence of Stackelberg pricing game between two platforms is as following: (1) Platform 1 decides the prices; (2) Platform 2 decides the prices after observing the prices of platform 1; (3) Agents decide whether to join the platform(s) or not after observing the prices of platform 1 and 2.
Process of Equilibrium
The process of solution is opposite to the game sequence (calculation is based on Matlab7 and we just list the main process as following rather than results of each step because of complexity):
(1) Demands. Developers are differentiated by the fixed cost that they incur when joining each platform. The fixed cost per platform is the same regardless of whether a developer joins one or both platforms, i.e., there are no economies of scope in joining multiple platforms. So developer's demand of platform j is:
Let us now turn to the case of symmetric competition side. Users are distributed along a Hotelling segment [0,1] with density 1 and transportation costs ( 0) t t > . Assume that the distribution of users' location is independent to the distribution of users' information, based on the condition that marginal user is indifferent to join each platform, we have users' demands:
Solve with the equation (1) and (2) simultaneously, we have demand functions 
Finally the expectation will be fulfilled: 
Comparisons of Equilibrium Prices between Two Platforms
We can compare the equilibrium prices between price leader and follower based on the content of table 1, the results are shown in the All prices 0
Responses of Equilibrium Prices to Crossgroup Network Externality
We can have the responses of equilibrium prices
